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Abstract: This paper analyzes the international determinants that led to and triggered the 
Bosnian War in the 1990s. An overview of the Socialist Yugoslavia and its international 
stance up to its dismemberment is presented at first, focusing on the integration of the country 
in the international system (and its impact on Yugoslavia) and on its international economic 
status. Then, the onset of the war and the actions of the Great Powers — United States, 
France, Germany, United Kingdom, and Russia — are analyzed, looking at the undermining 
of the Yugoslav state's sovereignty and the empowerment of domestic actors through external 
support to belligerent groups. It is seen that after Yugoslavia's economic destabilization, 
foreign interference propelled the start of the war by making the belligerent groups in Bosnia 
confident because of their foreign support. Geopolitical interests were a determinant of the 
Bosnian War, which was characterized as an intractable ethnic conflict to hide political 
agendas at play. 
Keywords: Bosnian War; Yugoslavia; Post-Cold War geopolitics; Dismemberment of 
Yugoslavia;  Great power politics; Ethnic conflict. 
OS DETERMINANTES INTERNACIONAIS DA GUERRA DA BÓSNIA 
Resumo: Este trabalho analisa os determinantes internacionais que levaram a e 
desencadearam a Guerra da Bósnia na década de 1990. É apresentado um panorama da 
Iugoslávia socialista e seu posicionamento internacional até o seu desmembramento, focando 
na integração do país no sistema internacional (e sua influência na Iugoslávia) e no seu status 
econômico internacional. Então, são analisados o início da guerra e as ações das Grandes 
Potências — Estados Unidos, França, Alemanha, Reino Unido e Rússia — com atenção ao 
enfraquecimento da soberania do Estado iugoslavo e o empoderamento de atores domésticos 
através do apoio estrangeiro a grupos beligerantes. Nota-se que, após a desestabilização 
econômica da Iugoslávia, a interferência estrangeira levou ao início da guerra ao tornar os 
grupos beligerantes na Bósnia mais confiantes por causa de seu apoio externo. Interesses 
geopolíticos foram um determinante da Guerra da Bósnia, a qual foi caracterizada como um 
conflito étnico intratável para esconder os planos políticos em jogo. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Geopolitical disputes in South-Eastern Europe are back. Politically motivated 
ethnic violence has erupted recently in Macedonia, triggering once again the fear that the 
situation escalates into broader confrontations and even civil war in the Balkans 
(GEORGIEVSKI, 2015). Russia has stated its support to the Macedonian government, while 
the West broadly condemned the incident (STRATFOR, 2015a). Not only that, but the current 
migration and refugee crisis in Europe have also strained the relations of Balkan states, which 
serve as a passage route into the European Union (STRATFOR, 2015b). Alignments in the 
Balkans may be shifting and to better prevent escalations an understanding of the past is 
needed and the Bosnian War, which ended only 20 years ago, is an example of how (not) to 
cope with the situation. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is located in a region which Kissinger (1999, p. 
208) characterizes as being a “no manʼs land, between the Ottoman and Habsburg empires”. 
Apostolova (1994) notes that its location is exactly the division line between many European 
empires throughout History. Similarly, Huntington (1993) affirms that it represents an inter-
civilization border between Catholicism and Christian Orthodox doomed to conflicts. 
In fact BiH was dominated by the Ottoman Empire for many centuries until the 
end of the XIX, when it came under control of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This meant the 
presence of three large religious groups in the country, namely Muslim, Christian Orthodox, 
and Catholics. In effect, Mazower (2002, p. xxxv) notes this “disconcerting interpenetration 
of Europe and Asia, West and East”. However, for hundreds of years there had been no 
animosity between these religious groups (MAZOWER, 2002), which are frequently 
portrayed as different ethnicities, although some authors, e.g. Vizentini (2002) and Severo 
(2011), affirm that they all belong to just one ethnicity, the South Slav. 
Glenny (2001) states that the violence that erupted in the end of the XIX century 
and mainly during the XX occurred primarily due to influence of the worldʼs Great Powers. 
This influence would once again be evident by the end of the XX century when a discourse of 
ethnic violence (and cleansing) in the region was brought about to justify the intervention by 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Political commentators, politicians and 
military officials of the West described the issue as one of “ancient hatreds”, “historical 
rivalries” that made the Balkans a “power keg” (e.g. ALLCOCK, 2000, p. 1–2). The conflict 
was later considered by some scholars to be “intractable”, i.e. persistent and deemed 
impossible to resolve because of the violent history of the region (COLEMAN, 2006; 
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DODER, 1993; GAGNON JR., 1994; HALL, 2014). The characterization of the conflict as 
such, dissolving it into a spectrum of ethnic violence and ‘internal war’, denied it analytic and 
historical specificity.2 It removed all responsibility from international actors. And their actions 
have been fundamental in Yugoslav history. 
These international determinants can be particularly noted in the creation of the 
First Yugoslavia. Serbia, independent since the beginning of the XIX century, began 
nurturing the idea of unification of all Slav peoples in the Balkans at the same time that Italy 
and Germany were being unified (GLENNY, 2001). However, this was only possible after the 
First World War — whose trigger was exactly Sarajevo, the capital of BiH. That is when the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (later named the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) was 
established, serving the interests of France, Britain, and the United States in containing 
German and Soviet expansionism (HUDSON, 2003). 
The influence of the Great Powers was once again felt during the Second World 
War. Nazi Germany conquered large portions of the Yugoslav Kingdom for economic 
reasons, but also to contain the Soviet Union (USSR). At the same time, Hitler established a 
puppet state in Croatia and divided the country in other eight units with Hungary, Bulgaria 
and Mussoliniʼs Italy (GLENNY, 2001). Croatia became nominally independent and its 
fascist regime, led by Ante Pavelić of the Ustaše Party, turned the region into “one great 
slaughterhouse” (GLENNY, 2001, p. 486). By this epoch the first acts of violence started 
being committed between the Yugoslav sub-nationalities3 in a generalized way and by 
influence of foreign powers. 
From this, it is possible to notice that “Their [the Western powersʼ] attitudes 
towards Yugoslavia varied according to their strategic aims and it is these which have 
primarily, although not exclusively, determined Yugoslaviaʼs trajectory” (HUDSON, 2003, p. 
1). Moreover, concerning the importance of the region, North (2009) says that: 
The Balkans do not float above a sea of oil; nor is it a barren wasteland. But 
its strategic significance has been a constant factor in imperialist power 
politics. If only because of its geographic location, either as a critical transit 
point for Western Europe toward the east, or as a buffer against the 
expansion of Russia (and later the USSR) toward the south, the Balkans 
played a critical role in the international balance of power. 
                                                          
2  See Ramet (2005) for an interesting and comprehensive summary of the debate pertaining the 
dismemberment of Yugoslavia and its causes. 
3  For analytical purposes this paper considers the nationality of South Slav peoples to be Yugoslav. To refer to 
each of the Yugoslav “nations”, as expressed in Yugoslavia’s constitution, the terms sub-nationality, sub-
national group, and ethnicity are used. 
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Indeed, Cordell & Wolff (2009) note that the international dimension of ethnic 
conflicts — such as the one in BiH —, alongside other factors, is vital to a comprehensive 
understanding of it.4 Therefore, the aim of this article is to answer the question of what were 
the main international determinants that led to and triggered the conflict in Bosnia in the early 
1990s. The purpose is not to discover a single cause of the Bosnian War, nor to list all of the 
domestic and external factors that originated it. The intention is to contribute to the debate5 
pertaining the issue and to draw attention to the main international roots and triggers of the 
conflict in BiH. 
In view of that, the framework of analysis will draw from Harff & Gurr (2004) 
and Lobell & Mauceri (2004). The former states that there are two relevant factors to deal 
with the international context of ethnic conflicts, pointedly the external support to opposing 
ethnicities/belligerent groups and the international economic status of the country/region 
(HARFF; GURR, 2004). The latter share a similar view. For them the factors are the 
reduction of state sovereignty and the empowerment of domestic actors and interest groups 
(with an increasing role of non-state regional and international actors) and the degree of 
economic, social, and cultural integration within the regional or global system (LOBELL; 
MAUCERI, 2004). Lobell & Mauceriʼs view is very similar to the one by Harff & Gurr and 
only seems to widen it. 
Thus, this paper’s hypotheses are that 1) before the onset of the war, there had 
been external support to non-state actors within Yugoslavia, which encouraged them to secede 
and wage war; and that 2) the Yugoslav changing insertion into the world economic order is 
at the root of the conflict, especially the foreign pressure for the adoption of neoliberal 
policies. Accordingly, this paper will first present a broad overview of the Socialist 
Yugoslavia and its international stance up to its dismemberment, focusing on the integration 
of the country in the international system (and its impact on Yugoslavia) and particularly on 
its international economic status. The second part of the article will, then, deal with the onset 
of the Bosnian War and the actions of the Great Powers (mostly the United States, Russia, 
France, the United Kingdom, and Germany) which may have triggered it, closely looking at 
reduction of state sovereignty and empowerment of domestic actors through external support 
to belligerent groups. 
 
                                                          
4  Halliday (1995) stresses that most conflict analyses avoid relating security within states to international 
security, because, if too close a relation is established, then unwelcome policies to prevent wars and conflicts 
may follow. 
5  See footnote 1. 
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2 YUGOSLAVIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
 
2.1 Yugoslavia During the Cold War 
 
After overcoming the challenges posed by the rivalries between the peoples of the 
Western Balkans arisen from the massacres perpetrated during the Second World War, the 
Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP) and its partisans were the only multi-ethnic political force 
in the region (BOSE, 2007). Then, the YCP rapidly came to power in Yugoslavia through the 
military dominion of the region; collaborators of the Ustaše and the Chetniks were defeated in 
less than a year after the war (MAZOWER, 2002). Besides that, the authority of the partisans 
— and particularly from Josip Tito Broz, leader of the movement — was legitimized through 
strong popular support due to the success of the struggle against the fascist occupying forces 
for the liberation of the country and without the participation of foreign allies (GLENNY, 
2001). Thence, the autonomist and non-aligned character of the autochthonous socialist 
regime that was established was very significant. 
This aspect of the new regime reflected in its foreign policy, which was not 
aligned to any of the worldʼs two superpowers (the U.S. and the Soviet Union). The country 
was actually closer to Third World countries and to neutralist positions opposed to either bloc, 
a fact that helped the creation of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (VIZENTINI, 
2002). Yet, in this context, Yugoslavia ended up indirectly serving Western purposes, since it 
was containing the Soviet Union by not aligning to it. Glenny (2001) tells that the country had 
friendly relations with both the West and the Soviet bloc, besides the Third World, being able 
to participate in businesses all around the globe in the sectors of construction and engineering, 
for instance. Accordingly, during the Cold War, Yugoslavia was one of the most influent and 
respected countries of the international scene (GLENNY, 2001; VIZENTINI, 2002). 
This independent foreign policy was, however, just one of the three fundamental 
pillars of the new Yugoslavia. The other two key factors of the state were the economic self-
management and the “ethnic harmony policy” (APOSTOLOVA, 1994). The first was an 
intermediary form of management between central state planning and market economy in 
which great investment and profit-sharing autonomy was granted to the countryʼs regions and 
its workersʼ councils (APOSTOLOVA, 1994; GLENNY, 2001; WOODWARD, 1995a). The 
second refers to a neutralization of sub-national feelings as well as to a greater standardization 
of what would (or should) be the Yugoslav nation, according to Apostolova (1994). In this 
context, Tito perceived any form of sub-nationalism (Croats, Slovenes, Serbs and others) as a 
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threat to the state and, consequently, he suppressed such manifestations in favour of the 
greater good of the country, even if they were not necessarily (GLENNY, 2001).6 
Furthermore, it should be noted that Tito consciously built the new Yugoslavia in opposition 
to the first one — which had been based on Serb hegemony for the maintenance of the 
countryʼs unity —, aiming, therefore, at a free association of equally sovereign states in the 
form of the Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia (ŽIŽEK, 1999).7 
 
2.2 Yugoslav Economic Crises and International Involvement 
 
Yugoslavia had great socioeconomic development until the 1970s, when liberal 
economic reforms could not be sustained due to the rise of unemployment and inflation 
(SEVERO, 2011).8 Because of that, Yugoslavia had to resort to foreign loans to deal with its 
economic crisis, worsened by the return of many Yugoslav workers who had migrated to 
Western Europe seeking better opportunities (GLENNY, 2001; HUDSON, 2003; 
SCHÖPFLIN, 1997). Hudson (2003) and Woodward (1995a) notice these foreign loans were 
only granted by international creditors — especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF)9 
— provided that there were Yugoslav counterparts, particularly reforms aiming at greater 
economic liberalization, which, on their turn, further aggravated the situation of the country. 
Besides that, these reforms introduced as prerequisites to IMF loans reoriented the Yugoslav 
economy towards the production of goods destined to Western European markets, 
economically favouring Slovenia and Croatia, the republics physically closer to them 
(HUDSON, 2003). This context generated considerable tension between the Yugoslav 
republics, because the most developed ones (Croatia and Slovenia) did not want to keep 
bearing the costs of Belgradeʼs projects to develop the least favoured regions of the country, 
namely Macedonia, BiH and Kosovo (GLENNY, 2001; HUDSON, 2003; VIZENTINI, 
                                                          
6  It is called “sub-nationalism” for it is considered in relation to the Yugoslav nationalism. The ethno-
nationalisms or sub-nationalisms of Yugoslavia still bear the same characteristics of Gellner’s definition: 
“[…] nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut 
across political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state […] should not separate 
the power-holders from the rest” (GELLNER, 1983, p. 1). 
7 The country was federally structured and composed of six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia) plus two autonomous regions within Serbia (Vojvodina and 
Kosovo). 
8 Freyberg-Inan (2006) further asserts that the Yugoslav economic crisis was triggered by the rapid rise of oil 
prices in the 1970s as well as the global debt crisis by the end of that decade when the US and other creditors 
raised interest rates unilaterally. 
9  In June 1980, Yugoslavia contracted a debt with the IMF amounting US$ 441 million. In the following year 
the agreement was replaced by one adding up to almost 2 billion dollars. In 1984 a further agreement was 
signed in the amount of US$ 319 million (TYSON; ROBINSON; WOODS, 1988, p. 82). 
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2002).10 As Severo (2011, p. 80) points out “[the] pressure of these [Western financial] 
institutions for liberal reforms and the dependence on them, together with the international 
context of the time, generated the bases of the crises that would burst during the 1980s”. 
Accordingly, the situation was exacerbated in the mid 1980s when the economic 
situation once again reached a low point due to the high foreign debt and the accompanying 
liberalizing reforms.11 Even though the federal government was seen as the main responsible 
for the situation, reforms to further centralize the control of the economy were demanded by 
the international creditors (HUDSON, 2003). Moreover, the United States began conditioning 
its economic assistance to the execution of elections in the country, which were to be carried 
out separately in each republic and not at the federal level (PARENTI, 2002). As a 
consequence, Croats and Slovenes — which persevered in their critics to income 
redistribution among the republics — started to call for political reforms to constitute a 
multiparty system, a market economy, and rule of law as a means of handling the crisis, even 
though they were fiercely against the economic centralization demanded by the IMF 
(APOSTOLOVA, 1994; SOARES, 1999). The future of the Yugoslav socioeconomic model, 
highly dependent on Western powers, was in check. 
At the time, there were promises that Yugoslavia might join the economic 
integration process taking place in Western Europe, the European Economic Community 
(EEC). In the early 1980s, the EEC had allowed Yugoslavia to sell 70% of its industrial goods 
duty free in EEC markets. This measure favoured Croatia and Slovenia as they were the most 
industrialised regions of the country. Conversely, Yugoslav agricultural products did not have 
an easy access to EEC markets due to high tariffs. West Germany and Italy accounted for 
70% of the trade between Yugoslavia and the EEC (GOODRICH, 1992, p. 159). Although 
Belgrade did not fulfil the prerequisites, Yugoslavia’s admission as a full member of the bloc 
was used as a tool to pressure the country into harsher liberalizing reforms. Moreover, 
according to Shoup (2008), fears of a Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia due to a continuing 
instability there spurred the EEC to take this course of action. 
Yugoslavia also resorted to the Soviet Union. Both countries had been politically 
estranged since the 1950s, when Moscow imposed trade barriers and other restrictive 
                                                          
10 The debate pertaining this issue led to political reforms in the mid-1970s towards greater decentralization of 
administrative structures, which is one of the main domestic factors which led to the disintegration of the 
country (BOSE, 2007). 
11 In 1988 the inflation rate reached 217% p.a. and the unemployment was at 13% by the end of the same 
decade; many inhabitants of the poorer republics were migrating to the more prosperous ones (i.e. Croatia 
and Slovenia) (SOARES, 1999). 
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measures towards Belgrade.12 Trade level between them was almost insignificant until the oil 
crisis of the 1970s, which made Yugoslavia seek Soviet oil. It served as a starting point for an 
increased bilateral trade, which increased tenfold between 1972 and 1984 (MAKSAKOVA, 
2015). However, the trade balance between the USSR and Yugoslavia tended to negative for 
the latter. In 1983, Belgrade informed Moscow, its main trade partner, of its intention to cut 
the amount of Soviet imports so as not to incur in greater foreign debt and currency shortage 
(GOODRICH, 1991).13 The plan was successful. In 1985 Yugoslavia had a great surplus, a 
trend that was maintained until the dismemberment of the country (MAKSAKOVA, 2015). 
Notwithstanding that, it should be noted that these surpluses were to no avail to the financial 
crisis, because Soviet-Yugoslav trade was conducted in the form of barter transactions 
(GOODRICH, 1991). Since they did not use hard currency, Yugoslavia could not accumulate 
it to service its foreign debt. 
When Mikhail Gorbachev, leader of the Soviet Union, visited Belgrade in 1988, 
the issue was at the top of the agenda (SHANKER, 1988; TAGLIABUE, 1988). Plans were 
made to start hard currency transactions, while Soviet oil prices were to be tied to world 
market prices. However, it did not start immediately and bilateral trade started to be described 
as Soviet “debt” or “interest-free credit” from Yugoslavia (e.g. BEBLER, 1990; 
REMINGTON, 1991). Two years later, the USSR agreed to pay it back in a three-year period 
and to end barter transactions already in 1991. But to reach this deal, deemed to be good for 
the liberalizing reforms being implemented in Yugoslavia, the federal government had to 
agree to conditions which further strained its relations with the republics and aggravated the 
socio-economic crisis: 
the Yugoslavs agreed to early repayment of $230 million of commercial and 
$650 million of interstate, government credit. This means that Yugoslav 
firms, borrowing from the USSR, are expected to pay their own federal 
government instead of the creditor. Or to put it differently, the Belgrade 
government must now collect $230 million from Yugoslav enterprises 
(REMINGTON, 1991, p. 110). 
 
Other aspects of the liberalizing reforms carried out by Ante Marković from 1989 
onward added to the turmoil. They abolished the self-management system and all traces of the 
socialist economy in the country. Severo (2011) notes that, under the guidance of international 
                                                          
12  In 1948 occurred the Tito-Stalin split. In the following decades, Yugoslavia harshly criticised the Soviet 
interventions in eastern Europe (Hungary, Czechoslovakia) and Asia (Afghanistan), which pushed them 
further apart. 
13  Singleton (1989) tells the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China offered aid and loans while 
Belgrade was negotiating with the IMF in the early 1980s. Moscow’s aid came in the form of increased 
import of Yugoslav goods. Beijing’s a US$ 120 million loan (SINGLETON, 1989, p. 277). 
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creditors such as the World Bank and the IMF14, the attempt at creating a free market 
economy amidst austerity measures abolished the social welfare protections granted by the 
socialist system to the individuals at the federal level.15 Susan Woodward (1995a) notices that 
IMF policies were particularly inappropriate, because they constantly failed and after each 
failure a new dose of IMF credits and policies were required. These entailed cutbacks in 
production and labour — thereby fuelling unemployment16 — in order to fight inflation 
(WOODWARD, 1995a). Not only that, but Marković’s reform also threatened the right of 
sub-national equality, especially regarding proportionality of employment (of the sub-national 
groups) in the public sector (SEVERO, 2011; WOODWARD, 1995a). Furthermore, the 
federal government also suspended its transfer payments to the republics and provinces so as 
to be able to pay the foreign debt under the instruction of its creditors, and it increased the 
animosity of the republics towards the federal government (CHOSSUDOVSKY, 1997; 2002; 
WILLIAMS, 2004).17 
As a result of these reforms, half of the Yugoslav companies faced bankruptcy 
and the industrial workforce was deeply devaluated (SEVERO, 2011). This package of 
reforms and its corresponding legislation, structured to dismantle and privatize the socialist 
Yugoslav economy as fast as possible — following international guidelines — brought about 
socio-political chaos and fragmentation (HUDSON, 2003). 
This is, in fact, the starting point of the political construction of the ethnic 
identities by the leaders of each republic. McQuay (2014) stresses that, while differing 
national identities do not themselves lead to war and multinational states are not “naturally” 
destined to fail, the politicization of the sub-national groups created the necessary conditions 
for the economic crisis to polarize Yugoslav society. Vilification of other ethnic groups 
became a political tool for exclusion where previously there had been one single community 
                                                          
14  In 1988 the IMF and Yugoslavia reached a deal to reduce debt servicing and in 1989 another loan was agreed 
upon amounting to 600 million dollars (SHOUP, 2008, p. 337). 
15  These neoliberal policies and austerity measures have started to be questioned even by the IMF itself 
(ELLIOTT, 2016). See, for instance, the piece “Neoliberalism: oversold?” written by IMF economists Ostry, 
Loungani and Furceri (2016) published by a journal of the institution in 2016. 
16  By the end of the 1980s, the unemployment rate in the country reached over 17%, with another 20% 
underemployed, and 60% of the unemployed were under 25 years old (BODUSZYŃSKI, 2010, p. 66). 
17 Chossudovsky claims this suspension was the final blow on Yugoslav unity: “In one fell swoop, the 
reformers engineered the final collapse of Yugoslavia's federal fiscal structure and mortally wounded its 
federal political institutions. By cutting the financial arteries between Belgrade and the republics, the reforms 
fueled secessionist tendencies that fed on economic factors as well as ethnic divisions, virtually ensuring the 
de facto secession of the republics” (CHOSSUDOVSKY, 2002). 
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(DEUTSCH, 2006).18 Vizentini (2002) suggests the ethnic character is a representation of a 
social, political, and economic conflict in a crumbling world. In other words, “the necessity of 
a political legitimisation of the new forces in power and of a slogan for social mobilisation, in 
a context of ideological vacuum, transforms nationalism in a consequence of the socio-
economic transition process itself” (APOSTOLOVA, 1994, p. 102). 
Yet the inter-regional dispute still presented proposals for the coexistence of the 
different sub-national groups within a reformed Yugoslavia: Croats and Slovenes argued for a 
confederation, while Serbs and Montenegrins sought a more centralized federative system, 
and Bosnians and Macedonians took an intermediary position (APOSTOLOVA, 1994). The 
federal government of Ante Marković favoured the maintenance of the federation but with the 
introduction of multi-party democracy19 and reforms towards a free market economy, just as it 
had been happening elsewhere by the end of the Cold War (HUDSON, 2003). This situation 
is described by Crawford (1998) as one in which ideological debates merged with conflicts 
between the centre and the regions. Instead of straightforward secession, a change of nature of 
the Yugoslav state was being debated. In this context, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and France supported the central government in its intention of political and economic 
liberalization (HUDSON, 2003). 
Moreover, concerning the Western powers, their assertiveness in trying to change 
the socioeconomic system of the country is very striking. There was no room for discussion 
on defaulting the loans, the dispute was clear-cut about the restructuration of the Yugoslav 
system and the refinancing of the debt, while concerning Latin America, which was 
undergoing very similar problems, the stance of the same Western countries was not as 
unyielding (WOODWARD, 1995b). Freyberg-Inan (2006) notes that the Westʼs main 
interests in the situation were the Yugoslav foreign debt payment, the consolidation of neo-
liberalismʼs hegemony, and market opening. These three factors, interconnected, justify the 
proposition that the interference of world powers in the Yugoslav question was fundamental 
to its disintegration (SEVERO, 2011). 
                                                          
18  McQuay (2014, p. 27) informs that as late as 1989 3¨% of Yugoslavia’s population declared themselves to be 
“Yugoslavs” by nationality rather than choosing a sub-national group, a remarkable sign of shared political 
identity and sense of community. 
19  Notice that “The introduction of political pluralism in an ethnically plural environment without democratic 
traditions can lead to divisions along ethnic lines, as politicians and parties use ethnic identification of people 
for their political purposes. This happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and other parts of the country. 
Nationalism and nationalistic policies were used to mobilize ethnic political support and to frame new 
national interests and politics, consequently contributing to problems in ethnic relations and to the escalation 
of crisis and conflicts in Yugoslavia and its different parts, especially in the ethnically more plural and 
diverse republics.” (ŽAGAR, 2009, p. 459). 
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Once it became clear that there was a military build-up by all sides in 1990, 
Western countries were still officially committed to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
the country. So was the USSR. However, the West would frequently make statements against 
it. Indeed, the United States made a declaration stating that the use of force by the Yugoslav 
National Army (YNA) to maintain the territorial integrity and unity of the country — the very 
essential function of a stateʼs armed forces — would be unacceptable (HUDSON, 2003). Still, 
this apparent paradox of Western countriesʼ policies towards the escalation of the Yugoslav 
crisis becomes understandable when one considers the political views of the leaders behind 
the main belligerent forces: Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman. Milošević, president of 
the Serbian Socialist Republic and who had effective control over the YNA, was opposed to 
the liberalizing reforms carried out by the federal government and instead supported renewing 
the self-managing socialist system. Tuđman, on the other hand, was supposedly in favour of 
market capitalism following western precepts and democracy. Even before the armed conflict 
started, the former was “demonized” by the West and the latter “glorified”, although both 
were authoritarian, intolerant, and ultra-nationalistic (HUDSON, 2003). Consequently, it is 
noticeable that the difference of treatment given to these leaders from the onset originated 
from their political-economic views (one autonomist and the other pro-West) and not from 
authoritarian leanings, hate speech or any other reason shown by the media at that time 
(HUDSON, 2003; SEVERO, 2011). 
 
2.3 The End of the Cold War and Its Impact on Yugoslavia 
 
Yugoslavia served as a buffer state between the Western and Soviet blocs during 
the Cold War. By itself, the country did not represent a threat to the balance of power of the 
conflict, although it constituted certain danger to any force that wished to incorporate the 
Balkans as a sphere of influence (SEVERO, 2011). Belgrade itself worried that either 
Moscow or Washington would invade its territory in a war between the superpowers. 
However, the Yugoslav state served mostly the strategic interests of the United States, since it 
contained the Soviet Union and impeded Soviet access to the warm waters of the 
Mediterranean Sea. In fact, a great majority of the YNA was stationed at the border with 
countries of the Warsaw Pact, since Belgrade thought that Moscow could intervene in the 
country as it had done in Afghanistan, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia (BEBLER, 1990; 
MCQUAY, 2014). This is further corroborated by the provision of financial help by the 
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United States to the country because of its role in the American strategy against the USSR 
(USA, 1984). 
Then, as a consequence of the end of the Cold War, Yugoslavia lost its strategic 
position of balancing the Soviet Union and the United States. Already during the 1980s its 
role began to erode because of several international political events. The paradigm that 
oriented international affairs after the two world wars entered a phase of decline at the same 
time as a new — yet unknown — international order was being established (ARTURI, 2005). 
In the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev introduced political and economic reforms and unilaterally 
reduced the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe.20 The late historian, Eric Hobsbawm 
(1992), affirms that the reforms being carried out in the USSR undermined, by the force of 
example, the central command and authority structure which allowed communist regimes to 
operate (including Yugoslavia) and that the rise of nationalism was a by-product of this 
phenomenon. In Western Europe, the European Community was further deepening its 
integration through the approval of economic and monetary union. Also in the 1980s, the 
United States overcame the economic crisis of the previous decade by boosting up the 
economy with liberal economic policies and a special focus on the defence industry. 
By the end of the decade all of this meant that there was no longer any challenge 
by the Soviet Union to the U.S.-centred capitalist model. The main symbol of the collapse of 
the Communist alternative and triumph of the West was the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, 
which also reverberated in the internal balance of power of Europe, especially because of the 
political and economic power that a reunified Germany would have in the continent. 
Nevertheless, this invigorated Western Europe still did not have the capabilities to challenge 
the American military and economic might and its leadership in the international system. In 
sum, the world came into a transitional period of consolidation of American hegemony 
throughout the world, which was guaranteed in political, economic and military spheres 
(SEVERO, 2011). 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization also had to be reoriented after the end of 
the Cold War. Questions about NATO’s existence emerged with USSR’s withdrawal from 
Eastern Europe and ultimately its dissolution, since the alliance’s role of countering the 
Warsaw Pact vanished: Its own raison dʼêtre had disappeared (MEDCALF, 2005). In that 
case, the United States argued that the organisation should have an offensive and preventative 
                                                          
20  This further eroded the central role of the YNA within Yugoslavia, since one of its main legitimating factors 
was the defence against the Soviet Union in case of an intervention from Moscow (BEBLER, 1990; 
MCQUAY, 2014). 
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attitude and that it ought to expand to the East (especially in order to avoid any convergence 
between Russia and the European Community) (SEVERO, 2011). In the end, NATOʼs 
involvement in the Yugoslav dismemberment was a question of justifying its existence after 
the Cold War and legitimising American policies: “[The] organisation was no longer of 
collective defence against a possible attack from the USSR, but an instrument to propagate 
American values” (SEVERO, 2011, p. 103). The preservation of NATO had also other 
strategic values, most importantly the maintenance of close transatlantic relations, while 
containing the political power of the reunifying Germany (VIZENTINI, 2002). 
Consequently, Yugoslaviaʼs role of containing the Soviet Union was no longer 
needed in the American strategy. The country would have to give in to the new international 
logic of adherence to the American values, because there was no room for a socialist country 
in such a strategic place in Europe (SEVERO, 2011). That is why the United States and 
Western Europe began calling for the opening of the Yugoslav and other socialist markets to 
the world economy. However, there were sectors of the economy in Eastern European 
countries (and in Yugoslavia) that were not favourable to capitalism and stood up against 
(drastic) changes. The American and Western European support to separatist forces within 
Yugoslavia makes sense in this context: The political-economic views of the belligerent 
groups mattered for them, i.e. they would support only those that favoured an open-market 
capitalist economy regardless of international law and undemocratic tendencies. 
Broadly speaking, divergences among political leaders within Yugoslavia about 
restructuring the economy originated separatist ethnic movements — propped up by Western 
countries —, ultimately leading to the disintegration of the country (SOARES, 1999). The 
political elites of Croatia and Slovenia — the most developed Yugoslav republics —, 
generally supported neoliberal economic policies, but most of them were against the 
preservation of unified Yugoslavia for they did not want to subsidise the poorer republics of 
the country. They deepened their trade with Western Europe, especially Germany, thus, 
entering its influence zone and receiving assistance from them (economic and military). The 
Serbs, on the other hand, were staunchly against most neoliberal policies and mobilised 
around the issue. As a response, the West raised several economic and military sanctions, 
besides being characterised by the Western media as the unreasonable antagonists of the crisis 
(SEVERO, 2011).21 
                                                          
21  For instance, the United States imposed sanctions on Yugoslavia already in 1990–1991 even before open 
conflict had started. These included a suspension of all aid (summing US$ 5 million) and threatened to block 
the concession of IMF loans (new or already agreed upon) (BINDER, 1991). They are known as the Nickles 
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The findings of this section corroborate this paper’s second hypothesis. The 
Yugoslav insertion into the world capitalist economic order was indeed at the root of the 
conflict that would take place in BiH and other Yugoslav republics. Yugoslavia’s place in the 
international system was challenged. Its economic crises and foreign pressures for neoliberal 
adjustments fuelled nationalisms in the country and created the conditions that led up to the 
wars. The confirmation of the hypothesis does not mean there were no other causes (internal 
or international), nor does it exhaust the international factors prior to the escalation of the 
conflict. Yugoslavia’s dismemberment is too complex an issue to be considered a mono-
causal process. The following section will delve into the international factors that contributed 
to the escalation of Bosnia’s conflict in particular, paying close attention to foreign support to 
belligerent groups. 
 
3 THE COUNTDOWN TO THE BOSNIAN WAR 
 
While the political elites in Slovenia and Croatia were already openly talking 
about secession in the beginning of 1990, Bosnia and Herzegovina conducted multiparty 
elections. Three nationalist parties won, one for each ethnicity (Serb-Bosnian, Croat-Bosnian 
and Bosniak22). In spite of hostilities towards one another, they formed a coalition 
government to oppose those parties that were pro-Yugoslavia and against ethnic-based 
nationalisms (UDOVIČKI; ŠTITKOVAC, 2000). The leader of this government would be 
Alija Izetbegović, a Bosniak with a past of fundamentalist Islamism (HUDSON, 2003).23 
When the war started in Croatia and Slovenia in 1991, BiH did not take part in the 
hostilities and neither manifested interest in becoming independent too. In spite of everything, 
soon the Bosnian government was trapped between Croatia and Serbia, both of which 
pressured BiH in order to destabilise it and be able to divide Bosnian territory between them 
(APOSTOLOVA, 1994; GLENNY, 2001). As a consequence, Izetbegović began considering 
the idea of secession, driving the Serb-Bosnians off of the coalition (BOSE, 2007). 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Amendment (or sometimes Nickles-Bentley) and intended to target Milošević and the Serbs in particular. By 
the time the White House officially still supported the unity of Yugoslavia, but US Ambassador Zimmerman 
(1996, p. 184) affirms that the US Congress “downplayed, ignored, or even criticized the importance” of it. 
22  The term Bosniak is used to refer to the Muslim population of Bosnia. 
23  In 1970 Izetbegović wrote a piece called “Islamic Declaration” in which he called for an Islamic state in 
Bosnia as soon as Muslims achieved a majority (SAMARY, 1995). Izetbegović was incarcerated for Islamic 
fundamentalism in the 1980s for five years (and condemned to 14) and pardoned in 1988 (DE KRNJEVIC-
MISKOVIC, 2003). After the secession crisis had started in Yugoslavia, Izetbegović started to publicly refute 
allegations that he was fundamentalist and denied intentions of establishing an Islamic state in Bosnia 
(RAMET, 2005). 
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Besides the Serb and Croat pressure, the policies of the European Community 
were also decisive for Bosnian political forces to start entertaining the possibility of declaring 
independence. After civil war started in Croatia and Slovenia, the EC created an arbitration 
commission on 27th August 1991 (called Badinter Commission) to deal with the legal 
questions pertaining the recognition of new states in substitution of Yugoslavia. There was 
significant disagreement among the members of the bloc. Germany, Austria, Denmark, and 
Hungary supported the self-determination of Croats and Slovenes, while France and the 
United Kingdom favoured the preservation of Yugoslavia. At the outset, the Commission 
considered Yugoslavia was undergoing an irreversible process of dissolution (instead of 
secession), i.e. it paved the way for the recognition of the republics as independent countries 
(BOSE, 2007; WOODWARD, 2000). This met the principle of isonomic treatment to all 
republics forwarded by Spain, France, the U.K., and the U.S., but it was going against the 
German calls for the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia only (WOODWARD, 2000). 
Afterwards, the Badinter Commission decided that the republics would only be 
recognised by the EC based on the internal borders of Yugoslavia, which ought to become 
international ones through the International Law principle of uti possidetis iuris24. Moreover, 
the republics would also have to fulfil several other criteria defined by the commission. The 
most important of these criteria were, to be precise, a constitutional protection to minorities 
and popular support for independence through referenda (COUSENS; HARLAND, 2006).25 
Shortly thereafter, it decided that those republics wishing to be recognised as independent 
states ought to file their requests until 24th December 1991 for analysis. Consequently, the 
stipulation of this deadline put enough pressure on Izetbegović to ask for international 
recognition of BiH, which he did on the last possible day as a way to make sure that the 
Bosniaks would have a place at the table of future negotiations (UDOVIČKI; ŠTITKOVAC, 
2000; WOODWARD, 2008). As a response, the YNA started to fortify its positions in Bosnia 
so as to deter secessionism: “It was clear that the entire disposition of the army was directed 
to preventing Bosnia-Herzegovina from pursuing a path to independence and to keeping the 
republic within a truncated rump Yugoslavia.” (MEIER, 1999, p. 200). 
                                                          
24 This principle states that the one that legally possesses the territory has the right over it, or, in other words, 
the territory belongs to whom possesses it according to what has already been established by law (SHAW, 
1997). According to the International Court of Justice, it is a principle that in its essence tries to maintain the 
respect to territorial limits of a country when it becomes independent in order to avoid the dangers posed to 
its stability by fratricidal conflicts provoked by the contestation of borders after the withdrawal of the 
administrative colonial power (ICJ, 1986). It was used in the case of Yugoslavia to avoid the use of force for 
changing borders (WOODWARD, 2000). 
25 Some other criteria were: respect to the rule of law, democracy, human rights, disarmament, nuclear non-
proliferation and regional security (WOODWARD, 2000). 
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The Bosnian request was denied by the Badinter Commission due to the absence 
of a referendum in the republic about the independence (PELLET, 1992). Instead the 
European Community organised a mediation in February 1992 to solve the issue in response 
to Izetbegovićʼs attitude. The proposals of the so-called Lisbon Agreement, which grosso 
modo intended to divide BiH in three territorial units or cantons that would share the central 
government. The agreement, however, stipulated that all districts would be classified as Serb, 
Croat or Muslim, even where there was no majority. This caused the first clashes between 
Croat-Bosnians, Bosniaks, and Serb-Bosnians in BiH. Territorial dispute seemed to make 
impossible the agreement’s implementation. 
Meanwhile, a referendum was organised in Bosnia also in February 1992 for 
satisfying the Badinter Commission’s criteria for recognition. Results were overwhelmingly 
in favour of independence (98% of the votes) (BOSE, 2007; UDOVIČKI; ŠTITKOVAC, 
2000). However, it was boycotted by the Serb-Bosnian population, that did not wish to break 
away from Yugoslavia. In addition to that, shortly before the referendum in January 1992 they 
declared the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a political entity within Bosnia that 
wished to remain a part of Yugoslavia. Bose (2007) tells that the Serb-Bosnians composed 
approximately 37% of the electorate, i.e. only 63% of the people voted on the official 
referendum. Because of that, the recognition of independence could not be granted to BiH 
according to the opinion of the Badinter Commission. 
Nevertheless, Izetbegović declared the countryʼs independence on 3rd March 1992 
after Croatia was unconditionally recognised as an independent country sooner that year by 
Germany26 (and followed by the whole EC shortly afterwards) regardless of the rules 
stipulated by the Badinter Commission.27 Thus, this recognition violated International Law 
(HUDSON, 2003; VISENTINI; PEREIRA, 2008; VIZENTINI, 2004). Not only that, but the 
recognition of Croatia as an independent state meant the remainder of Yugoslavia would be 
dominated by the Serbs, which was at that point an important factor for BiH’s future within or 
                                                          
26 Germany had interests in having a cheaper way out to the Mediterranean Sea and access to the markets of 
Yugoslavia, and this Croatia and Slovenia could provide. For that reason, Germany led the international 
movement for their recognition. In addition to that, there is evidence that the German intelligence service 
provided training to the Croat army (HUDSON, 2003). The country was also responsible for convincing the 
United States to support the dismemberment of Yugoslavia (FRANÇA, 2004). Câmara (2013) and Glenny 
(1996) stress that the German (and Austrian) position reflected its historical, cultural, and economic interests 
in the region, but Serbia perceived it as an expansion of German imperialism. 
27 What happened was a simple bargain: The other EC countries followed Germany, because the terms of the 
Maastricht Treaty were being under negotiations and giving in to the German position was the best choice for 
the Community, which was trying to develop a common economic policy (SEVERO, 2011). Germany could 
have been sanctioned for its premature attitude, but France and the U.K. depended on German goodwill on 
European integration matters (BEARCE, 2002). 
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without the federation (MEIER, 1999). Izetbegović also hoped to increase his leverage on 
future negotiations with the measure. 
After the declaration of independence, on 18th March 1992 all three sides signed 
the Lisbon Agreement. Izetbegović for the Bosniaks, Radovan Karadžić for the Serb-Bosnians 
and Mate Boban for the Croat-Bosnians. However, ten days after signing it, Izetbegović 
withdrew his support. Hudson (2003) and Binder (1993) affirm that it happened due to strong 
American influence, which had been pushing for international recognition of BiH since 
February.28 Carr (1995) tells that the Bosnian Muslims rejected the plan following an 
assurance from the US and Germany that BiH would be recognized, given UN membership, 
and, that they could get a better deal than was currently on offer. Fact is that on 28th March 
1992 Izetbegović met the US Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann (DE 
KRNJEVIC-MISKOVIC, 2003). Although Zimmermann later denied it, there have been 
several reports that he told Izetbegović not to follow through with the Lisbon Agreement and 
wait for a better one favouring an unitary state in BiH (BINDER, 1993; DE KRNJEVIC-
MISKOVIC, 2003; BELOFF, 1997 apud HUDSON, 2003). In a declaration for The New York 
Times he even gave an account of the meeting with the Bosnian leader: “I told him 
[Izetbegović], if he didn't like it [the Lisbon Agreement], why sign it?” (BINDER, 1993). 
There was even a hint of possible US military assistance to BiH against the Serbs: 
Izetbegovic's repudiation of the […] agreement […] was the immediate 
trigger for the war. Whether the Muslim leader repudiated this agreement 
because of pressure from militants at home […] or because he understood 
America's advice to reject it as an implicit pledge of military support remains 
unclear. Given the distribution of military power in Bosnia at the time, the 
only way to make sense of Izetbegovic's decision is to assume that he did 
believe that the United States would make good on his military inferiority; 
the support Izetbegovic received from the United States to oppose 
cantonization may well have given him the confidence to take this fateful 
step (TUCKER; HENDRICKSON, 1993 apud DE KRNJEVIC-MISKOVIC, 
2003). 
 
Afterwards, the United States and Germany recognised the independence of the 
country on 6th April 1992, before any political settlement could be reached, and pressured EC 
and NATO members to do the same (CARR, 1995; GLENNY, 2001). Full-scale war began 
on the same day.29 
                                                          
28 Bosniaks were receiving support from several Middle Eastern countries as well, especially Iran and Turkey. 
There are also reports that Iranian specialists trained Bosniak soldiers for the war (HUDSON, 2003). 
29  As previously stated, there had been clashes between Bosniaks, Serb-Bosnians and Croat-Bosnians as early 
as February 1992. However, on 6th April the conflict gained greater international dimensions with the 
recognition of BiH. Furthermore, on 8th April the Bosnian government announced the formation of a single 
national army, which prompted the Serb-Bosnians to declare the independence of the Serbian Republic 
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During these events the Soviet Union underwent internal turmoil that culminated 
in its dissolution in August 1991. Before this event, Gorbachev referred to the situation in 
Yugoslavia in terms of the possible Soviet breakup, but he did not establish direct connections 
between both. After August 1991 and until February 1992, Moscow did not have a well-
developed policy towards the situation in Yugoslavia because it was self-absorbed (GOBLE, 
1996). Goble (1996) suggests the pace of dramatic changes within Russia meant that the 
Russian diplomats had little time to discuss the Yugoslav situation. Accordingly, Russia 
tended to echo Western statements so as to build a good partnership with the US and the EC. 
Although Moscow generally supported the unity of Yugoslavia, it ended up following the 
Western actions and recognized BiH on 27 April 1992. 
Hence, the referendum recommended by the Badinter Commission as well as the 
Western recognition of independence of former Yugoslav republics precipitated the start of 
the war in Bosnia. The former has shown how the foreign meddling in the conflict worsened 
it once the principle of consensus among all three sub-national groups was transgressed (and 
imposed a majority principle) not taking into account the particular realities of the region 
(BOJOVIC, 1992). European and American policies to cope with the crisis led to an 
intensification of the violence, culminating in the war that would last four long years. 
Therefore, the first hypothesis of this paper is also confirmed. There was 
considerable foreign support to secessionist groups in Yugoslavia and BiH. While Germany 
and others supported Croatian and Slovene separatism, which contributed to the aggravation 
of the conflict in Bosnia, US support to the Bosniaks and Izetbegović in particular encouraged 




The view that an intractable ethnic conflict was going on in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and elsewhere in the Balkans was disseminated internationally by the West to 
hide the political and economic objectives at stake and to justify its intromission in the matter. 
The ethnic character of the conflict was rather a consequence of it and not its cause, which is 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(Republic Srpska). A few days later Izetbegović ordered the troops to attack all barracks of the YNA in BiH 
(CARR, 1995). 
30  Not only the YNA, Croat-Bosnians and Serb-Bosnians fought against Izetbegović. In Bosnia’s northwestern 
region there was a Bosniak-dominated province (Bihac) which opposed the government of Izetbegović and in 
fact fought against his forces until NATO’s bombing campaign started (HUDSON, 2003; PARENTI, 2002). 
Thus, the characterization of the conflict as an ethnic one is again put into question. 
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more related to domestic political and economic reasons and foreign designs (GLENNY, 
1996; GUIMARÃES, 2012). 
In line with the frameworks of analysis of Harff & Gurr (2004) and Lobell & 
Mauceri (2004), the study presented the international stance of Yugoslavia up to its 
dismemberment, focusing on the countryʼs role in the international system (and the systemʼs 
impact on Yugoslavia) and its international economic status. Furthermore, an examination 
was conducted about the actions of Great Powers which have led to the Bosnian War. 
During the Cold War, Yugoslavia was a socialist yet non-aligned country which, 
from the American perspective, contained the Soviet Union in Europe (and its access to the 
warm waters of the Mediterranean). It was not fully integrated to neither bloc, but it was able 
to trade with both, i.e. Yugoslavia managed to retain its independence to conduct its foreign 
economic affairs. The country underwent several economic crises in the 1970s and the 1980s 
that prompted an international involvement, especially through the IMF and the World Bank, 
which stipulated neoliberal reforms in return for loans. These reforms, however, further 
eroded the political and economic stability of the country, engendering the emergence of 
nationalistic discourses. 
These liberalising measures imposed by international creditors are to be 
understood in the context of the end of the Cold War. Yugoslavia could no longer hold the 
position of buffer state, because the Soviet Union was heading towards its eventual 
dissolution. Therefore, it had no place in the greater strategy of the United States. And, in a 
context of reforms in the USSR, Moscow was no much help since it was undergoing some of 
the same troubles as Yugoslavia. This confirms the second hypothesis. Yugoslavia’s insertion 
into the world capitalist economic order was indeed at the root of the conflict that would take 
place in BiH and other Yugoslav republics. 
At first sight, the West declared support to the Yugoslav Federation. This policy 
was taken as a tactics to foster neoliberal structural adjustments, integration to the capitalist 
world market, and to reimburse the loans granted to the country. Yet, as soon as they realised 
the issue was more serious than imagined, different opinions began to emerge as to what 
ought to be done. France and the United Kingdom stood against the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia, while Germany and others backed up the plea for independence of the rich 
separatist republics, pointedly Croatia and Slovenia, which were more closely integrated to 
the Western European economy than the other Yugoslav republics. The German position, 
followed by other countries, in fact ended up eroding the sovereignty of Yugoslavia while 
empowering sub-national actors. 
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The reaction of the United States at first was one of leaving the subject for Europe 
to deal with it. However, after the European Communityʼs inability to adequately lead the 
process, the U.S. came to the table. The country led the political and economic offensives for 
a regime change in the country, while Germany fostered the secession of the most developed 
republics to recover its sphere of influence in the Balkans lost at the end of the Second World 
War. These two foreign policies combined — secession and regime change — resulted in the 
end of Yugoslavia. The dismemberment wars and NATOʼs intervention also gave the 
organisation a new raison dʼêtre, whose destiny was at stake after the Soviet debacle 
(VIZENTINI, 2002). 
Concerning the Bosnian War per se, foreign interference in effect propelled its 
start by supporting different belligerent groups and making them confident because of this 
foreign support. Germany legitimised the notion of the division of Yugoslavia through its 
support to Croatia and Slovenia, while Russia, the United Kingdom and France officially 
supported the maintenance of the Yugoslav federation (a position identified with the Serbs). 
These stances reflected on the internal strives in Bosnia, whose opposing parties were 
encouraged by this support as well, notably the Bosniaks with support from the U.S. This 
confirms the first hypothesis of external support to sub-national actors within Yugoslavia: 
While Germany and others supported Croatian and Slovene separatism, which contributed to 
the aggravation of the conflict in Bosnia, US support to the Bosniaks and Izetbegović in 
particular encouraged them to secede from Yugoslavia and wage war. 
The American policy towards BiH is also noteworthy as it was very divergent 
from the European one. The United States was at the same time trying to contain both a 
weakened Russia and a stronger Western Europe, especially after the steps the EC had taken 
to deepen its integration process and after having become free from its main adversary (the 
Soviet Union). Moreover, after USSR’s dissolution Russia did not have a foreign policy for 
the issue and tended to agree with Washington’s positions, which ultimately converged into 
the recognition of BiH’s independence (albeit in a later date). 
In sum, the international determinants of the Bosnian War played a large role in 
the conflict. The work here presented is not an exhaustive study of all causes, domestic or 
international, of the Bosnian War. The dismemberment of Yugoslavia was not caused by a 
single variable and the confirmation of both hypotheses does not mean there were no other 
factors at play. However, it shows international economic interests destabilised Yugoslavia, 
which had already been suffering from economic crises, causing the emergence of 
nationalisms in sub-national groupings. This paper contributes to the debate concerning the 
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issue by drawing attention to geopolitical factors. Geopolitics determined that Yugoslavia was 
no longer needed after the Cold War and instead a regime friendlier towards neoliberal 
capitalism. The interplay between Great Powers — above all between Germany, the United 
States, France, and Britain — once again triggered a savage conflict in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. In the end, the uncertainties arisen with the end of the Cold War were solved 
when the United States ascertained its power more decisively in the region through NATO 
and the Dayton Agreement, but only after four years of a bloody conflict. 
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